In his New York Times article, “Crack's Legacy: Soldiers of the Drug War Remain
on Duty,”16 Timothy Egan explains:

…what started as a response to the violent front of the war on drugs has evolved, here and in cities
across the nation, into a new world of policing. Special Weapons and Tactics squads, once used exclusively
for the rare urban terrorist incident or shootout, transformed themselves through the crack years into everyday
parts of city life….

Encouraged by federal grants, surplus equipment handed out by the military and seizure laws that allow
police departments to keep much of what their special units take in raids, the Kevlar-helmeted brigades
have grown dramatically, even in the face of plummeting crime figures.

“It is the militarization of Mayberry,” said Dr. Peter Kraska, a professor of criminal justice at Eastern
Kentucky University, who surveyed police departments nationwide and found that their deployment of
paramilitary units had grown tenfold since the early 1980s. “This is unprecedented in American policing
and you have to ask yourself: What are the unintended consequences?”

Not only are police acting like soldiers, but thanks to Reagan and Bush, who weakened the Posse Comitatus
law (that for more than a century had forbidden the military any role in U.S. law enforcement), soldiers are
now entering police work - as they did in Redford, Texas.

In 1994, a survey of 300 U.S. Marines17 raised alarms with its finding that 26.34 percent of the
respondents would unhesitatingly fire upon U.S. citizens if ordered to do so. But what's the problem?
Presumably 100 percent of civilian police are willing to fire upon criminal American citizens.
It's part of their job.

The problem isn't only who's doing the enforcing. It's attitude. Remember the old police motto,
“Protect and Serve?” It's a far cry from the soldiers' “Kill 'em all; let God sort 'em out.”
While “protect and serve” has always been, to some degree, a myth - ask anybody from Harlem, or any poor
white trash boy - it's nevertheless been a guiding vision. Police have seen - and should see - themselves as
part of the community. Not like this:

Members of the NYPD's Street Crime Unit are known as “the commandos of the NYPD.”
In existence since 1971, the unit has undergone a 300 percent build-up since 1997. Former NYC
Police Commissioner William Bratton encouraged the men to “become far more aggressive.”
Currently made up of roughly 400 mostly white officers, this unit, along with the 7,000 strong Narcotics
Unit, represent the front line in Mayor Giuliani's “quality of life” crackdown on - and criminalization of -
people of color, especially young, poor, and homeless people. They wear (and peddle) tee shirts that say:
“Certainly There Is No Hunting Like the Hunting of Men.” And their slogan is, “We own the night.”18
Of course, that's New York. Surely, the Dinuba, California's of the world are wising up? In fact, Dinuba
did wise up. It had to. The family of the grandfather that Dinuba's play-SWAT boys killed won a $12.5
million federal judgment against the city - a figure more than twice the town's annual budget.
Dinuba decided it didn't really need a military SWAT team after all.

But although some small cities have dumped their SWAT teams in the wake of lawsuits,
others aren't getting the message. According to an AP report, October 10, 1999:

Police in this Snohomish County city [Mill Creek, Washington], population 10,600, aren't taking
any chances. The department has bought surplus military gear for its 17 officers, including plastic riot shields
for $18 apiece, gas masks for $50 and helmets for about $8. The city has stockpiled military rations
and canvas tents. Mill Creek police are also considering a $1,200 tear-gas gun that can shoot canisters
through windows or into crowds.
All this for a city whose only violent crime last year was a robbery.

And yes, the U.S. military - in the name of the War on Drugs - continues to hand local police helicopters,
machine guns and training. In the wake of the Cold War, Congress, the White House and the Pentagon
are also casting about for new duties for the United States' standing army.

What next?

The fearful massacres of the Albigensians…had by no means extinguished the rebellion. In 1241 and 1242,
especially, the Inquisitors provoked such anger by their conduct that one of them was assassinated.
The Pope compelled the Count of Toulouse to lead his troops against them, and the war or
“crusade” was resumed.
Every year or so, Congressman James Traficant (D-Ohio) proposes legislation that would station
10,000 U.S. soldiers on the Mexican border to keep out drugs and illegal aliens. In February 1999,
he introduced HR 628, granting soldiers the authority to “prevent entry into the U.S.” by illegal aliens,
drug traffickers and terrorists. The bill would also have authorized the military to inspect all vehicles and
cargo entering the U.S. So far, Traficant's wishes have not made it intact into law, though they've found
strong support in the House and have begun to creep piecemeal into Defense Department appropriations bills.

The Defense Department has done an analysis of what it would take to close the U.S./Mexico border.
Their conclusion:

96 infantry battalions (48,000-96,000 soldiers)

53 helicopter companies (800-1600 aircraft, approximately 21,000 soldiers)

210 patrol ships

110 surveillance aircraft
And this doesn't count logistical support. In a brilliant article, “War on Drugs: Military Perspectives and
Problems,”19 analyst Joseph Miranda estimates that it would take nearly 500,000 soldiers simply to fulfill the
Defense Department's own estimates. Then he goes on to show why those estimates are far, far too low.

Continue to Prt 6